THE right to exclude intrusions by others, we have it on high authority, is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' Yet the right to exclude is not one right; it is itself a collection or "bundle" of rights. With respect to property in land, for example, the right to exclude depends to a large extent on whether the intrusion in question is subject to the common law of trespass or of nuisance.2 Generally speaking, when the intrusion is governed by trespass, then there is no exception for de minimis harms, a rule of strict liability applies, and the landholder can obtain an injunction to prevent future invasions. When the intrusion is governed by nuisance, however, then there will be no liability absent a showing of substantial harm, as a rule the landholder must show that the costs of the intrusion outweigh its benefits, and even then the party subject to the interference may be awarded only damages rather than an injunction for future harms. Thus, the right of a landholder to exclude means one thing with respect to certain intrusions-those subject to the law of trespass-but something altogether different with respect to others-those subject to the law of nuisance.
and so forth.4 For the moment, we need not consider the exact line of demarcation between the underlying phenomena or the rationale for that line. I will return to this issue and discuss it at length in Section III. It is first necessary to understand the legal consequences of classifying a given interference as being subject to the rule of either trespass or nuisance.
For this purpose, it is useful to refer to some simple examples drawn from recent cases. Suppose A and B are adjacent landholders. In case 1,5 B has a long driveway which runs along his common border with A. At the end of this driveway, B has a loading dock. In order for B's trucks to turn around and unload at the loading dock, B's agents must drive onto and back off from A's property. An intrusion of this sort-the repeated driving of trucks on and off a neighbor's property-is the sort of gross, tangible invasion that is governed by the law of trespass. In case 2,6 B has a factory which makes a great deal of noise when in operation; A has a family residence. For many years, B operates only one eight-hour shift, which does not unduly disturb A. Subsequently, in an effort to increase production, B starts operating three shifts around the clock. As a consequence, A can no longer sleep at night. This kind of intrusion-the repeated invasion of a neighbor's peace and quiet by sound waves-is governed by the law of nuisance.7
In terms of both substantive and remedial doctrine, there are major differences in the law that will be applied in case 1 and case 2. Substantively, the principal distinction8 is the standard of care that courts apply in determining whether the interference is actionable; that is, whether A's property interest includes the right to exclude B's offending intrusion or B's property interest includes the right to engage in the offending intrusion free of any exclusion from A. These disparities are most pronounced Intentional harms subject to the law of nuisance, in contrast, are governed by a standard of care that is neither so simple nor so rigorous. Indeed, some commentators have despairingly described the legal doctrine surrounding the concept of nuisance as an "impenetrable jungle.""6 Nevertheless, the description of the standard of care set forth in the Restatement of Torts, which is widely followed by American courts,17 provides at least an appropriate reference point for comparison to the law of trespass. According to the Restatement, " [t] here is liability for a nuisance only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would be suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in normal condition and used for a normal purpose.""8 Clearly, then, a mere "trifling inconvenience" is not actionable. 19 In addition, an intentional nuisance will result in liability only if it is "unreasonable." The primary definition of "unreasonable," again according to the Restatement, is that "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct. '"20 Following the Restatement in case 2, therefore, A will have to show not only that the loss of sleep would represent a "significant harm" to a 16 Id. at 571. person of normal sensitivities, but also that the harm to A and similarly situated neighbors is greater than the benefits that accrue to B and society generally from increased production and employment at the factory. 21 In addition, trespass and nuisance differ in terms of the remedies available once an actionable interference is established. Here, perhaps the most important distinction involves the standards for issuance of an injunction. With respect to intentional trespasses, courts will generally issue an injunction against recurring invasions without engaging in any "balancing of equities"-a weighing of the relative strength of A's interest, B's interest, and other possible societal interests-before granting the requested relief.22 With respect to intentional nuisances, however, almost all courts will engage in some such balancing exercise before issuing an injunction against future interferences.23 While they may not refer to the process as "balancing the equities," the weighing process nearly always takes place just the same. 24 Once an injunction is ruled out, either because the intrusion is a nonrecurring one or because of an unfavorable balance of equities, still differences persist, though perhaps less significant, in the standards governing the award of damages. Where the intrusion is a trespass, and A cannot show actual damages, courts generally award the plaintiff at least nominal damages.25 Failure to show actual damages in nuisance, in contrast, usually results in the denial of all relief (because of the failure to satisfy the "substantial harm" requirement for liability). Moreover, whether or not actual damages are incurred, punitive damages are more likely to be awarded for an intentional trespass than they are for an intentional nuisance.26 21 Under a purely economic cost-benefit approach, the relevant question would be what combination of inputs and activity levels would either maximize the joint profits of the parties or minimize their joint costs. Thus the court should not only inquire into the damages suffered by A and similarly situated persons, and the value of increased production to B Given these differences, how should we characterize the distinction between trespass and nuisance? The distinction does not really correspond to that drawn by Calabresi and Melamed between "property rules" and "liability rules."27 To be sure, in its remedial dimension the law of intentional trespass approximates a property rule-injunctive relief more or less follows automatically from liability, at least where the intrusion is a recurring one. But the law of intentional nuisance is neither a property rule nor a liability rule, but sometimes one and sometimes the otherdepending on how the court comes out in its "balancing of equities." Moreover, the property rule/liability rule distinction goes only to the question of remedies to protect substantive rights. As we have just seen, however, trespass and nuisance differ not only in terms of remedies but also in terms of the standards applied to establish substantive rightswhether or not A has the right to exclude intrusions by B in the first place.
A more central theme running through the differences between trespass and nuisance concerns the degree of discretion given to courts when resolving questions that involve both substantive and remedial entitlements. Indeed, entitlement-determination rules can be viewed as falling on a spectrum ranging from "mechanical" rules-those which afford little discretion to courts in the establishment of entitlements-to "judgmental" rules-those which afford very broad discretion to courts in determining entitlements.28 From this perspective, trespass would have to be regarded as the quintessential mechanical entitlement-determination rule. If an interference with an interest in land potentially qualifies as a trespass, all A must show to obtain an injunction barring B from future interference is that B is responsible for recurring invasions of the imaginary column of space which defines A's possessory interest. Once the prescribed invasions are shown, both the substantive right and the remedy follow mechanically-with little room for judicial discretion.
The law of nuisance, in contrast, reflects a judgmental entitlementdetermination rule. If interferences with an interest in land potentially qualify as a nuisance, then in order to obtain an injunction barring future invasions, A must (at least if we follow the Restatement account) satisfy a court (1) that he has sustained substantial harm from the interference; (2) that the harm to A and similarly situated persons outweighs the benefit to B and society generally if B is allowed to interfere; and (3) that an injunction against future interference by B is consistent with the balance of equities. These factors, especially factors (2) and (3), are highly judgmental; accordingly, they entail the exercise of a considerable degree of discretion on the part of the court. Moreover, even if the court does not follow the cost-benefit approach of the Restatement in determining the question of substantive entitlement, nuisance still falls at the judgmental end of the spectrum, in part because inquiries (1) and (3)-especially (3)-still involve a significant degree of discretion. In addition, even aside from the cost-benefit calculus espoused by the Restatement, the substantive law of nuisance contains a bewildering array of Latin maxims,29 conflicting formulations of the standard of care,30 and defenses and quasi defenses.31 All of these, taken together, confer a very broad discretion on courts as to how they come out in particular controversies.
If the mechanical/judgmental distinction accurately captures the core contrast between trespass and nuisance, then the question becomes, Why would a common-law system develop two sets of rules-one mechanical and the other judgmental-for determining the right of a landholder to exclude interference by others? In the next section, I will consider whether economic analysis can supply a hypothesis that would account for this phenomenon.
II. TRANSACTION COSTS AND ENTITLEMENT-DETERMINATION COSTS
The economic significance of the contrast between mechanical and judgmental entitlement-determination rules can be developed in terms of the familiar Coase theorem. rigorous assumptions-which include zero transaction costs, clearly delineated property rights, perfect information about production and consumption functions, no wealth effects, and maximizing behavior by all parties33-the assignment of property rights will not affect decisions about the use and consumption of resources. Regardless of who is initially assigned the property right, the parties will exchange or modify those rights until they achieve the allocation of resources which maximizes their joint welfare. This conclusion can be generalized to any operation of explicit markets. If the assumptions underlying the Coase theorem are all satisfied, voluntary rearrangements of property rights will maximize the aggregate welfare of all market participants.34
In the real world, of course, the assumptions underlying the Coase theorem are never realized. Nevertheless, in order to explore the significance of entitlement-determination rules, I will assume that all conditions necessary for an "ideal" allocation of resources are satisfied save two: the assumption of zero transaction costs, and the assumption of clearly delineated property rights-which I will refer to as the assumption of zero entitlement-determination costs. (If it is costless to determine legal entitlements, then the delineation of property rights should always be clear.)35 Given the potential ambiguity of these concepts,36 a brief word is in order about how they will be used here.
Transaction costs, as I will use the term, consist of the resources that must be expended in order to enter into and enforce contracts for the exchange or modification of property rights. As Coase put it, they are the resources that must be expended "to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with . . and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on."937 For present purposes, the magnitude of transaction costs can be seen as primarily a function of several variables largely independent of the nature of the legal regime:38 the difficulty of identifying the parties who may wish to exchange or modify property rights; the number of parties who will have to enter into the contract in order to make it effective; whether the relationship between the parties is "discrete" (one shot) or "relational" (long term); and whether one of the parties who wishes to sell or acquire property rights is in the position of a monopolist vis-a-vis the others.39 The more difficult it is to identify the parties to the exchange, the higher the search costs that must be incurred before entering into a contract. The larger the number of parties, the more complicated the contract must be, and the more likely it becomes that free-rider or holdout problems will develop.40 The more relational the situation between the parties, the more likely it becomes that the parties must provide for long-term monitoring, enforcement, or adjustment mechanisms, and the more likely it becomes that one or more parties will bargain strategically in order to influence the future course of dealings. Finally, if one of the parties is in the position of a monopolist vis-a-vis the others, the more likely it becomes that this party will hold out or otherwise bargain strategically in order to obtain a disproportionate share of the gains from trade.41 other costs that may interfere with the exchange or modification of property rights, such as the costs of gathering information about production or consumption functions and the costs of determining entitlements.
38 This is not to say that legal rules such as the law of contracts will not affect transaction costs. For example, I surmise that mechanical rules of contract law-such as the mirror image rule of offer and acceptance, the doctrine of consideration, the Statute of Frauds, and the parol evidence rule-will tend to lower transaction costs, whereas judgmental rules of contract law-such as implied warranties of merchantability, the doctrine of unconscionability and the like-will tend to raise transaction costs. For present purposes, the magnitude of entitlement-determination costs can be seen as primarily a function of whether the rules for determining property rights are mechanical or judgmental.42 Mechanical rules-such as the law of intentional trespass-are predictable and relatively inexpensive to apply: generally speaking, they can be applied by laymen with little or no input from lawers or judges. (This is probably the principal reason why the tax code, which relies on large-scale compliance by individuals not trained in the law, consists largely of mechanical rules.43) In contrast, judgmental rules-such as the law of intentional 42 Other factors are also clearly relevant, such as whether esoteric factual information must be developed; whether a government certificate or license must be obtained; and whether the rules are simple or complex (see note 43 infra). In the title search context, for instance, the applicable rules-the first-in-time principle as modified by recording statutes and various rules of construction-are largely mechanical. However, the title search process requires the gathering of esoteric information (contained in the public records office or in a title plant) and the rules involved, although mechanical, are in their totality fairly complex. Thus, laymen must usually incur the expense of hiring a lawyer or an abstract or title insurance company to determine the question of title. Nevertheless, it is striking how rarely the system leads to litigation: virtually all problems that arise can be resolved by purchasing title insurance or by renegotiating the terms of sale to give account to uninsurable risks. Thus, although positive entitlement-determination costs are involved, they are kept low by the mechanical nature of the rules, and hence they do not appreciably interfere with a functioning real estate market. 43 This is not to say that the tax code consists of simple rules. Indeed, it is a familiar complaint that the tax system has grown too complex to be self-administering, and should be simplified. The mechanical/judgmental distinction, however, is different from (and indeed cuts across) the simple/complex distinction. Moreover, I would argue that whether a rule is mechanical or judgmental is more critical to the magnitude of entitlement-determination costs than whether it is simple or complex (although obviously simple-mechanical rules would be the cheapest and complex-judgmental would be the most expensive). For example, even though the tax system may be too complex for many laymen to understand, it is still sufficiently mechanical that accountants and bookkeepers can (and do) fill out many tax nuisance-are unpredictable and relatively expensive to apply. Judgmental rules require a large input of legal advice and possibly even a judicial trial (or legislative or administrative action) before the assignment of property rights can be established. There is, however, another side to the distinction between these rules. Mechanical rules, being rigid and inflexible, may often produce results that, unless subsequently modified by the affected parties, are perceived as being unjust, unfair, or inefficient. On the other hand, although judgmental rules are more expensive, they are also inherently flexible, and thus can be manipulated by courts to achieve results which are "just," "fair," or "efficient." 44 The reasons why transaction costs must be zero in order to achieve the Coasian ideal of universal market solutions to resource use disputes should be fairly obvious. The gains from trade obtainable from any exchange or modification of property rights are limited. If the costs of identifying the affected parties, bargaining to an agreement, drafting a contract, and providing for enforcement of the contract are greater than the expected gains, then no exchange of property rights will take place.
The reasons why entitlement-determination costs must be zero for the Coase theorem to hold are analogous, and they are essentially the same as those given to explain why all litigation is not settled out of court.45 To be sure, uncertainty about who holds the property right is not invariably fatal to an agreement. If the parties share the same estimate of the probability of who holds the right, and the same preference for risk, then positive entitlement-determination costs should not matter-in theory, the parties should negotiate to the same welfare-maximizing allocation of resources they would have agreed on if property rights were certain, discounting the price to reflect the shared perception of the probability of who should pay whom. However, if the parties differ in their estimate of the probability of who holds the right, or in their preference for risk, then there may be no range of bid and asked prices within which they can agree on an exchange.46 In these circumstances, if there is to be any exchange or returns and can (and do) provide a great deal of tax advice. This is a far cry from the situation which would exist under a simple judgmental rule, such as a rule requiring each taxpayer to pay a "fair" or a "reasonable" portion of his income to the government as a tax. Such a rule would bring on the lawyers in droves. modification of property rights, the parties must expend resources on litigation (or other forms of collective resolution, such as political lobbying) to reduce the disparity between their assessments of the assignment of property rights. The very need to expend these resources, however, will mean that certain potentially optimizing agreements will never be reached, because the gains from trade will be less than the costs of litigation (or other forms of collective resolution). In other words, even in a situation where transaction costs are low relative to the gains from trade, high entitlement-determination costs may independently frustrate the achievement of an ideal allocation of resources. 47 Putting these two analytically distinct categories of costs together, one can easily determine the pattern that should emerge from a common-law system that (we may assume by hypothesis) seeks to fashion legal rules promoting economic efficiency.48 First, one would predict that when transaction costs are low, such a legal system would tend to adopt mechanical entitlement-determination rules. Mechanical rules entail lower entitlement-determination costs than judgmental rules, and coupling low transaction costs with low entitlement-determination costs should maximize mutually beneficial exchange or modification of property rights. But when transaction costs are high, market exchange is unlikely to take place, regardless of the choice of entitlement-determination rule. In these circumstances, the economically efficient choice will depend on a comparison of two variables: the increase in entitlement-determination costs entailed by a shift from a mechanical to a judgmental rule versus the potential efficiency gains from allowing the court (or some other collective decision maker) to exercise discretion in resolving the dispute, rather is larger than the plaintiffs, an out-of-court settlement will be reached rather quickly. See Posner, supra note 45, at 436.
47 Of course, simply because positive entitlement-determination costs prevent certain potentially advantageous agreements from being negotiated, this does not mean that the decision to forgo litigation in favor of the status quo is inefficient. Entitlement-determination costs, like transaction costs, are "real" costs and should not be incurred than adhering to whatever solution is dictated by a mechanical rule. If the magnitude of the latter is larger than that of the former (which in many situations I suspect it would be), then in high-transaction-cost situations it will be economically efficient for a legal system to adopt judgmental entitlement-determination rules.
In principle, these considerations are easy to apply to the law of trespass and nuisance. Trespass is clearly a mechanical entitlementdetermination rule, and thus one would expect the law of trespass to apply to disputes with low transaction costs. Nuisance, under either the Restatement formulation or the doctrinal obscurantism and inconsistency of the cases generally, is clearly a judgmental entitlement-determination rule. Hence, one would expect the law of nuisance to apply to disputes characterized by high transaction costs.
Testing this predicted relationship is another matter, however. It will not do simply to compare reported cases involving trespass and nuisance to see whether they involve high or low transaction costs. If lowtransaction-cost trespasses are more likely to be settled than hightransaction-cost trespasses (as the theory would suggest), then reported trespass decisions should contain a disproportionate number of hightransaction-cost cases. On the other hand, if low transaction costs make it easier not only to settle cases but also to engage in litigation (for example, because of the collective-action problems of assembling large numbers of plaintiffs or defendants, even with devices such as class actions), then reported nuisance cases should contain a disproportionate number involving low transaction costs-especially since judgmental entitlementdetermination rules will tend to frustrate the settlement of lowtransaction-cost disputes. Thus, an examination of reported trespass and nuisance decisions probably would not accurately reflect the underlying sample of controversies.
Given this state of affairs, there may be only one way of testing the predicted relationship, short of devising some method of sampling the underlying universe of disputes directly. This is to examine the commonlaw rules for determining the respective spheres of trespass and nuisance. If these "threshold rules" differentiate, at least crudely, between hightransaction-cost and low-transaction-cost situations, then they provide at least partial corroboration of the model. How then do common-law courts decide whether a particular intrusion is subject to the law of trespass or of nuisance?
III. COMMON-LAW THRESHOLD TESTS
Four distinct threshold tests applied by common-law courts to delimit the sphere of trespass from that of nuisance can be identified. Although each test has emerged at a different time in history, once having emerged none has been completely supplanted by its successors. Indeed, all four of these tests are still being invoked, either alone or in combination, in modern judicial decisions. 49 The first efforts to distinguish between trespass and nuisance date from the time of the Year Books. There were then three primary forms of recourse for intrusions on land:50 the various real actions, most prominently the assize of novel disseisin; trespass quare clausum fregit,51 a variant of trespass vi et armis; and the assize of nuisance. The distinction between trespass and nuisance depended on where the act giving rise to the intrusion occurred. If the defendant's act (short of physical ouster amounting to disseisin) occurred on the plaintiff s land, then the appropriate action was in trespass. If, however, the defendant's act occurred on the defendant's own land, then the proper action was in nuisance. "Thus, to go on the plaintiff s land and demolish a weir was a trespass which gave rise to the action of trespass: to stay on your own land and demolish a weir to the hurt of the plaintiff was a nuisance for which the assize of nuisance was the proper remedy. Nuisance could never be committed on the plaintiff s land: an act done on the plaintiff s land would be disseisin or trespass according to the circumstances."52
After the assize of nuisance fell into disuse and was, for all practical purposes, replaced by the action on the case for nuisance, a second test for differentiating between trespass and nuisance arose.53 This was based on the distinction understood to characterize the difference between trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case generally: that between "direct" The distinction between direct and indirect harms continues to play a role, at least verbally, in differentiating trespass and nuisance in English law, as well as in many American jurisdictions. But taken literally, the test has difficulty accounting for the judicial system's actual categorization of intrusions. Take, for instance, interference in the form of noise. The generation of excessive noise is universally regarded as subject to the law of nuisance rather than trespass,56 yet it is hard to see how this result follows from the direct versus indirect criterion. If pouring "stinking water" onto the plaintiffs land is a direct injury, then why is propelling sound waves at the plaintiffs land not a direct injury? The same can be said about shining light. Complaints about intrusions in the form of unwanted light are thought to give rise to an action for nuisance,57 but why is the hurling of electromagnetic waves at the plaintiffs land not a direct rather than an indirect injury?
The difficulty of squaring the direct versus indirect harm distinction with the actual categorization of intrusions eventually gave rise, at least in many American jurisdictions, to a third threshold test: one based on the physical dimensions of the agency or thing that invades the plaintiffs property. According to this test, "[t]respass comprehends an actual physical invasion by tangible matter. An invasion which constitutes a nuisance is usually by intangible substances, such as noise or odors."58 This dimensional test seems to reflect the actual categorization of intrusions better than the direct versus indirect harm criterion. If 1he defendant blasts rocks onto the plaintiffs land, or fires a shotgun across the plaintiffs land, this would constitute a trespass under the dimensional test: rocks and shotgun pellets are particles which, at least once they come to rest, are visible to the naked eye. In fact, these sorts of invasions are generally regarded as trespasses, at least by American courts.59 However, smoke, noise, odors, shining light, aesthetic blight, funeral homes, halfway houses, and so forth would be actionable only as nuisances, because they do not involve the invasion of particles which are visible to the naked eye. Here again, the decided cases are usually in accord with what the dimensional test would suggest." The dimensional test also receives semiofficial recognition in the standard definitions of trespass and nuisance. Trespass is typically said to be an interference with the "exclusive possession" of land; nuisance an interference with its "use and enjoyment.'61 An intrusion that displaces the plaintiff from exclusive possession of his land is almost invariably a tangible thing; less visible particles, while they may interfere with use and enjoyment, will not, in any literal sense, physically displace the plaintiff from occupying "his" space.
Despite an apparent capacity to explain the actual categorization of intrusions, and its tacit recognition in the popular definitions of trespass and nuisance, there are signs of judicial dissatisfaction with the dimensional test.62 Perhaps this derives from a belief, consistent with the general run of much modern tort doctrine, that a strict liability standard such as trespass should be reserved for "serious" harms and a balancing or cost-benefit approach such as nuisance limited to less serious harms. Given our understanding of the effects of chemical or radiological exposure, a court which assumes that strict liability should be reserved for serious harms is apt to be impatient with a doctrine that treats a neighbor who cuts across the lawn more severely than one who emits toxic gases or radiation. Another and more cynical explanation-but one that actually finds considerable support in the facts of the decided cases63-is that courts confronted with sympathetic plaintiffs have bent the traditional definitions of trespass to give them the benefit of a longer statute of limitations. For whatever reason, there is an emerging fourth threshold test for the division between trespass and nuisance, one based on a distinction between a "mere" interference with use and enjoyment-which is governed by nuisance-and an interference with use and enjoyment so severe that it amounts to a "constructive" interference with exclusive possessionwhich is governed by trespass.64 For example, in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,65 the court held that the plaintiff, forced to abandon his farm because of the invasion of invisible toxic gases, could maintain an action in trespass. The court explained: "If, then, we must look to the character of the instrumentality which is used in making an intrusion upon another's land, we prefer to emphasize the object's energy or force rather than its size. Viewed in this way we may define trespass as any intrusion which invades the possessor's interest in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical language of the physicist. '"66 This fourth threshold test is difficult to square with the traditional substantive law of trespass. 71 This is especially apparent in Borland, where the court stated that for direct invasions "actual damages need not be shown" and, if the invasion is intentional, strict liability applies; whereas for indirect invasions there must be "substantial damages to the res" and an invasion that affects an interest in the exclusive possession of property. 369 So. 2d at 529. rule would itself dramatically increase entitlement-determination costs, because of the judgmental character of deciding case by case whether market transactions are feasible. On the contrary, the model suggests that, in order to preserve the advantages of a mechanical entitlementdetermination rule, the law would gravitate toward a mechanical threshold test for deciding whether to apply trespass or nuisance. The model further suggests that the price of a mechanical threshold test will be a somewhat imperfect fit between the choice of entitlement-determination rule and the magnitude of transaction costs.
The earliest rule, based on where the defendant's act occurs, is highly mechanical and delineates a category of controversies usually characterized by low transaction costs: those arising when the defendant personally enters onto the plaintiffs land. In this sort of situation, it should not be hard to identify the parties to the dispute. Certainly, identification should be easy where the dispute is between neighboring landholders. Although it may be difficult for the landholder to make an identification where the intruder is a stranger,72 it should not be that difficult for the intruder to identify with whom he must deal-the person in possession, the landholder. Since the law gives the landholder an unqualified right to exclude, the intruder should know that he will have to initiate negotiations with the landholder or face virtual certainty of legal expulsion. In addition, the number of parties is apt to be small. Generally speaking, there will be only one or at most a few possessors of land, and the possessor can deal with intruders or potential intruders one at a time. test is underinclusive, for it omits a large range of intrusions where, while there is no personal entry by the defendant, the transaction costs of reaching a negotiated solution should be small.
The second threshold test, based on the distinction between direct and indirect injury, also appears on its face to invoke a mechanical standard. In practice, however, the notion of "directness" has proven to be quite slippery. The firing of bullets and blasting of rocks onto the plaintiffs property have been held to constitute direct injuries, but the shining of light or blaring of noise have been deemed to be indirect injuries. The concept of "directness" seems therefore to incorporate an unstated judgmental gloss. The direct/indirect distinction also does fairly well in capturing low-transaction-cost situations, but again has its limitations. Insofar as many direct injuries will involve a personal invasion by the defendant onto the plaintiff s property, the distinction covers the same ground as the first test. In addition, the directness test will capture certain interferences originating outside the plaintiffs property-such as intentional flooding or blasting-that also probably entail low transaction costs. Yet if we take the direct-interference criterion literally, it would extend to such phenomena as vibrations, noise, and shining light-interferences that, at least in populated areas, are apt to involve the difficulties typical of high transaction-cost settings: problems of identification, multiple parties, and the need for long-term monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the threshold test either breaks down into a judgmental rule or is overinclusive.
The third common-law threshold test, that based on the dimension of the particles involved in the intrusion, may actually do the best job of mechanically singling out interferences characterized by low transaction costs. To be sure, if the dimensional test were understood to mean that the invading material must satisfy some vague standards such as "substantiality," it would degenerate into indeterminacy. (Must it be bigger than a cannonball? Bigger than a bullet?) But the implicit understanding seems to have been that trespass is reserved for substances which, when stationary, are visible to the naked eye.75 This is a highly mechanical standard which can almost always be applied without recourse to litigation. Invasion by rocks is clearly a trespass; invasion by colorless gas is clearly not. The only borderline cases would involve dense smoke containing particulate matter such as soot, which may or may not contain individual particles visible to the eye.
In costs, the virtues of the dimensional test reside, first of all, in reducing uncertainties about the identity of the parties to the dispute. The source of things large enough to be visible to the naked eye-buildings, cars, boulders, flooding, and so forth-is relatively easy to trace, and hence both the party responsible for the intrusion and the parcels subject to the intrusion should be easy to match. Moreover, since visible things are generally not carried for long distances, disputes over such intrusions are likely to involve smaller numbers of parties-typically adjacent landholders. Finally, in contrast to interferences involving invisible agents-gas, noise, halfway houses, and so forth-interferences involving visible things are probably more likely to involve problems that can be solved without the need for some long-term monitoring or enforcement mechanism. Admittedly, the dimensional test is somewhat underinclusive-it is easy to think of cases involving intangible invasions that would not entail difficulties or identification, large numbers, or problems of contractual enforcement. But the lack of fit may be less severe here than it is in the case of the two earlier common-law standards.
The only threshold test that does not differentiate between high-and low-transaction-cost situations with any degree of success is the "modern theory" espoused by Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co. and the decisions following it. The distinction between a constructive interference with exclusive possession and an interference with mere use and enjoyment of property is a judgmental rather than a mechanical test, and thus from the outset it tends to frustrate the objective of facilitating the exchange and modification of property rights. Moreover, there would seem to be no correlation between invasions which constructively interfere with exclusive possession and low transaction costs. Air pollution-such as the fluoride gas involved in Martin-may constructively "oust" the plaintiff from possession, but may also involve large numbers of people; can present difficult problems in identifying those who are the source or who are affected by it; and may well require as part of its resolution some longterm monitoring or enforcement mechanism.76
In sum, the common-law threshold tests for determining the respective spheres of trespass and nuisance provide at least some corroboration for the transaction-cost/entitlement-determination-cost model. The dimensional test probably does the best job of differentiating between high-and low-transaction-cost situations, while preserving the character of trespass as a highly mechanical entitlement-determination rule. Significantly, without ever formally renouncing earlier tests, the common law has tended to evolve in the direction of the dimensional standard. Certain modern decisions, which purport to modify the dimensional test in favor of the idea of interference with constructive exclusive possession, are not inconsistent with this conclusion. In practice, these decisions require a new threshold test to differentiate between "traditional" and "modern" trespass, and there is authority to the effect that courts will adopt one of the three traditional common-law tests to perform this function.77 Thus, even though there have been expressions of dissatisfaction with the mechanical threshold tests, they continue to determine the dividing line between mechanical and judgmental standards for establishing the landholder's right to exclude. The seemingly arbitrary character of the rule has persistent features that render it both desirable and attractive.
IV. OTHER APPLICATIONS
Even if the transaction-cost/entitlement-determination-cost model can account for the respective spheres of trespass and nuisance, it does not necessarily follow that it offers the only explanation for the persistence of these two different types of rules for the determination of property rights.78 Clearly, the model's plausibility would be enhanced if it helped explain other issues involving the determination of property rights. In this section, I will attempt to suggest some other ways in which the potential for contractual exchange or modification of property rights may help to account for the nature of entitlement-determination rules.
The right to exclude suggests several situations where the mechanical standard of trespass seems to be required, but in fact the law adopts a judgmental rule. Airplane overflights provide a particular striking illustration of this sort of "exception" to the ordinary rules. Under a literal 77 Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979) (direct versus indirect test). 78 An alternative explanation, suggested to me by readers of this paper, is based on a distinction between acts of pure expropriation of resources (which are or should be subject to trespass) and acts in which resources are taken as a byproduct or spillover from some other form of productive activity (which are or should be governed by nuisance). However, whatever attractions this distinction may have as a normative matter, I am not convinced that it provides an adequate account of the division established by the common law. Take for instance the two decisions cited as examples in Section I supra. The case where the landowner's agents repeatedly drive trucks on the neighbor's property could be described just as easily as a "spillover" from a form of productive activity as it could be described as a form of expropriation, and yet it is clearly governed by trespass. On the other hand, the case where the factory owner decides to operate at night, even though he knows this will disturb the sleep of others, could be described as an expropriation of a resource (peace and quiet) belonging to others just as easily as a spillover, and yet it is clearly governed by nuisance. Thus the distinction between "thievery" and "mere external effects" is too indeterminate to account for the dividing line established in practice. some day be forced to drive his car would be prohibitive.82 Thus in this situation, the model would predict that the law would apply a judgmental rather than a mechanical entitlement-determination rule. In fact, the modern trend has been to reject a mechanical rule when the intrusion is neither intended nor known to be substantially certain to follow from the defendant's act, even though historically all trespasses were governed by one standard.83 According to the Restatement, for example, an unintentional trespass is actionable only if the invasion causes "harm" and only if the defendant acted "recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an abnormally dangerous activity.'"84 Standards like "recklessness" and "negligence" (or "abnormally dangerous activity" for that matter) involve judgmental rather than mechanical entitlementdetermination rules. Hence, as the model would predict, trespasses that tend to involve high transaction costs are governed by judgmental entitlement-determination rules. 85 The converse situation also exists: cases in which one might assume that a judgmental entitlement-determination rule would apply, yet which are in fact governed by a mechanical standard such as strict liability. One illustration of this is innocent building encroachments-cases in which the defendant erects a structure in the belief that it is on his own land, but it turns out to be on someone else's. At the time of construction, the encroachment is not intentional, and hence one might suppose that the intrusion would be subjected to the judgmental rule of unintentional trespass. Nevertheless, both the case law86 and the Restatement87 are quite clear in treating innocent building encroachments as an intentional trespass, subject to a rule of strict liability. This is consistent with the model. Unlike other sorts of unintentional trespass, building encroachments involve low transaction costs, at least when viewed ex ante-before the encroachment takes place. If the builder needs to purchase an additional strip of land from a neighbor, the costs of identification, coordination, and enforcement should all be low. Nor would we expect to find insuperable problems of strategic bargaining here, given that the builder has the options of redesigning or relocating the building or moving elsewhere. Of course, if we view the situation ex post, after the encroaching structure is built, there is an obvious potential for strategic bargaining: the neighbor now has a monopoly on something the builder desperately needs-title to the land on which the building sits. But it makes sense to adopt an entitlement-determination rule keyed to the ex ante situation. The costs to the builder of acquiring the necessary information to avoid an encroachment are almost certainly quite low relative to the value of the building itself: all he has to do is commission a lot survey before construction begins. Thus, adopting an entitlementdetermination rule that treats the builder as if he had knowledge creates a powerful incentive for the builder to make sure he does have knowledge. A mechanical rule of strict liability therefore performs two functions here: it has an in terrorem effect that induces the builder to find out whether he needs to negotiate with a neighbor, and it provides a baseline principle from which those negotiations can take place.88
Another illustration is provided by the common-law doctrine related to straying livestock. The common law did not treat straying livestock as a simple case of intentional trespass, perhaps because the wandering of livestock did not fit neatly within the direct versus indirect threshold test traditionally favored by English courts. Nevertheless, the common law was quite firm in subjecting straying cases to a rule of strict liability similar to the law of intentional trespass.89 In fact, the law here was, if anything, more mechanical than ordinary trespass, given the availability of the self-help remedy of distress damage feasant, which allows a landholder to hold intruding animals as security for compensation.90 Application of mechanical rules here is predictable, given the nature of disputes 88 Athough innocent encroachments are uniformly subject to a rule of strict liability, there is a discernible trend toward applying the "balancing of equities" before enjoining the builder to remove the structure. See Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 679, 705 (1953). To the extent courts follow this approach, they dilute the incentive effects created by a property rule, and increase entitlement determination costs, because of the difficulty of distinguishing between wilful and innocent encroachments. involving straying livestock. Domestic animals such as cattle and sheep are unlikely to stray very far, and identification of the possessory interests with which they are likely to interfere should not be difficult. Moreover, contractual solutions to straying problems (such as an informal agreement to fence) are unlikely to require elaborate enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the use of mechanical entitlement-determination rules renders a common "spillover" problem virtually self-regulating.
To be sure, the fact that a mechanical entitlement-determination rule is appropriate in this context does not resolve the question of which party should have the entitlement. Interestingly, there has been a split in positions, with England and most eastern states adopting a fencing-in rule and many western states adopting a fencing-out rule. The difference can be explained in terms of which baseline rule is likely to require the fewest contractual modifications. Thus, where there are many farmers and few ranchers, a fencing-in rule is appropriate; conversely, when there are many ranchers and few farmers, a fencing-out rule makes more sense.91 Indeed, as western states have become more cultivated, many have enacted legislation returning to the English rule. 92 The extension of the straying livestock cases to other "escaping" substances in Rylands v. Fletcher93 provides yet another illustration. Rylands has generally been confined to serious, nonrecurring accidents that interfere with interests in land. Ordinarily, these sorts of accidents would be governed by a judgmental rule such as negligence.94 However, the doctrine of Rylands, at least as it has been applied in England, provides that when such an accident is caused by a "nonnatural" use of land by an adjacent landowner, strict liability governs.95 The impulse to apply strict liability in these circumstances may be explained by the model. The fact that Rylands cases involve, for the most part, adjacent landowners, limits the problems of identifying parties and the number of disputants and thus normally results in low transaction costs. The requirement that the source of the interference be a nonnatural use is more ambiguous, but perhaps it can be seen as confining the application of strict liability to situations presenting relatively low information costs: if "nonnatural" means something that stands out as a prominent potential hazard, then the parties-or at least the party harboring the potential hazard-should be aware of the need to reach an understanding about preventive or precautionary measures or at least some decision about who should insure against the risk.
There are two problems with the Rylands doctrine, however, that help to explain both its uneven reception in America96 and its subsequent transformation into a judgmental entitlement-determination rule. First, the limitation of interferences between adjacent landowners was only implicit in the English cases,97 and American lawyers (understandably) sought to extend the rule to other situations involving high transaction costs, with at least some success.98 Second, even if the concept of "nonnatural use"-in the sense of something which stands out as a potential hazard-could be said to delineate a clear set of phenomena against the backdrop of rural nineteenth-century England, it clearly had no easily confined meaning in the context of a rapidly industrializing America. Both of these problems have vitiated almost any utility the doctrine may have had in facilitating private solutions to land use disputes in America. In most states, therefore, the initial response was to reject the doctrine of Rylands in favor of the law of negligence.99 More recently, the doctrine has grown in acceptance, but only after being transformed into something the Restatement calls liability for "abnormally dangerous activities." As defined by the Restatement, this is not a mechanical rule, but a judgmental rule somewhat along the lines of the law of nuisance.'00 Given that in 96 Prosser, supra note 11, at 508-09. 97 Turning to issues involving the right to consume or use property, there is also evidence of the transaction-cost/entitlement-determination-cost model at work. For example, much of the doctrine used to resolve conflicts arising when ownership of property is divided among two or more persons can be explained by the model. With respect to concurrent interests-such as tenancies in common or joint tenancies-common-law courts have long been reluctant to arbitrate disputes concerning the use or consumption of property. Instead, courts have followed the rule that any concurrent owner can, at any time and for any reason, petition for partition of the property.'0' The partition action is a mechanical entitlementdetermination rule, in that the right to obtain partition is virtually absolute-the court will generally entertain no objections or defenses from the other concurrent owners. 02 This is as one would expect, given that the costs of reaching a mutual accommodation among concurrent owners (who are often members of the same family, such as husband and wife or siblings) should be low. Indeed, when the number of concurrent owners gets too large, the law of partition tends to favor the transformation of the pattern of ownership into one where the transaction costs are more manageable.
When the ownership of property is divided over time, however, the common law embraces quite different principles. For example, when ownership of a parcel is divided between a life estate and one or more remainders, the law of partition does not apply to resolve disputes over the use or consumption of the property. Instead, courts apply ajudgmental entitlement-determination rule known as the law of waste. 03 Applicaof a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes . A related pattern can be discerned in the area of promises respecting the use of land. Between the contracting parties such promises are enforceable to the same extent that any contract is enforceable. 05 The very existence of the contract indicates that transaction costs are low, and provided adequate notice has been given of the existence and terms of the promise, it should be enforced according to its terms.'06 But it is another matter when the contracting parties attempt to bind their successors to the terms of the agreement. If all we were concerned about were twoparty transactions between the promisor's successors and the promisee's successors, there would be no problem: if one or both successors did not like the original agreement, either because of changed tastes or changed circumstances, they could negotiate a release. In cases involving subdivisions and similar developments of land, however, real convenants and servitudes frequently bind multiple parcels of property, and each property owner is given a veto over modifications proposed by any other. Given the potential for holding out that such a unanimity rule creates, this is a classic high-transaction-cost situation.
Not surprisingly, therefore, promises that purport to run with the land are subject to judicial scrutiny under a highly uncertain and complex set of rules concerning intent, notice, "horizontal" and "vertical" privity, whether or not the promise "touches and concerns" the land, and "changed circumstances." 107 The net effects of this body of law is to create ajudgmental entitlement-determination rule giving courts a considerable degree of discretion as to whether to enforce any particular promise against successors. To be sure, this judgmental rule is probably overbroad, since it applies both to subdivision-type agreements and to simple two-party agreements and is not restricted to the problem of changed circumstances. Nevertheless, some kind of judgmental entitlementdetermination rule is necessary in this context in order to overcome the collective action barriers to eliminating a promise that has outlived its usefulness. 08 Finally, the contrast between mechanical and judgmental entitlementdetermination rules sheds light on yet another stick in the bundle of rights known as property-the right to compensation for government takings. In declaring that "[t]here is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins,"'09 the Supreme Court in recent years has applied a multifactorial balancing test to determine when the government has so diminished the value of property as to exact a compensable taking."10 This doctrine is widely acknowledged to confer a broad range of discretion on courts;"' what we have, in other words, is a judgmental entitlementdetermination rule.
Under the model proposed herein, the Supreme Court's formula may be a response to a situation characterized by high transaction costs. And indeed, it appears that the Court's judgmental standard has emerged in cases involving general regulations or land use ordinances where the costs of identifying affected individuals and reaching an accord on the amount of compensation are substantial. What courts really do in "inverse condemnation" suits, at least according to an economic analysis, is weigh the social costs of denying compensation against the settlement costs (transaction costs of identifying all affected property owners and reaching an agreement as to the amount of compensation) and decide whether, on balance, the government action should be deemed a taking."'2 Use of a judgmental entitlement-determination rule obviously facilitates this sort of calculus.
Not all takings cases involve high transaction costs, however. For example, suppose the government institutes a formal eminent domain proceeding to condemn two dozen contiguous parcels of farmland for a highway. Although a private highway-building entity might encounter in-superable holdout problems in this situation, the government's power of eminent domain has the ability to overcome these sorts of transaction costs. In fact, once the government has asserted its right to condemn the property, the remaining transaction costs-identification of the affected parties, negotiation of a price, and so forth-should generally be low.113 Thus, if it is possible to identify a class of government actions (analogous to formal condemnation proceedings) where transaction costs are low relative to the social costs of denying compensation, it would make sense to jettison the judgmental rule for what constitutes a taking and establish a mechanical rule. Use of a mechanical rule in these circumstances would eliminate litigation over whether the action is a compensable taking, and facilitate a negotiated settlement of the only issue between the partiesthe amount of compensation owing.
The 
V. SOME NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Even if the common law has taken transaction costs into account in setting entitlement-determination rules, it has not done so perfectly. Only an extreme determinist would assert that common-law rules evolve in such a way that they always reflect the best of all possible worlds. The dimensional test for differentiating between trespass and nuisance is a case in point."18 Although the test does fairly well in singling out a class of low-transaction-cost disputes for mechanical rules, it is underinclusive. There are clearly many nuisance disputes that must be characterized as involving low transaction costs, and yet they are handled by an extremely judgmental standard that tends to frustrate negotiated solutions.
One possible way to improve on the underinclusiveness of the dimensional test would be to generate two sets of nuisance rules-one for relatively high-transaction-cost situations, another for relatively lowtransaction-cost situations. Such a bifurcation could perhaps be achieved via the ancient distinction between public and private nuisance. As interpreted today, these categories overlap to a considerable extent and are subject to doctrine that is frequently indistinguishable. Older cases, however, insist that a private nuisance is one that affects only a few parties, while a public nuisance affects the public at large."9 Given that the small numbers/large numbers distinction is often a good proxy for high and low transaction costs, this suggests, in turn, that the public/private-nuisance distinction could be used to achieve a bifurcation in nuisance law. To complete the transformation, private nuisance would have to be recast in more mechanical terms-perhaps by adopting something like the substantial physical invasion test that constitutes the cornerstone of Richard Epstein's restatement of English nuisance law.120 Public nuisance could then be governed by the cost-benefit formula of the American Restatement, coupled (if one desires) with a relaxation of the standing requirements that have traditionally served as an impediment to public nuisance suits by individuals. 121 The net result would be three different standards governing intrusions to property-trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance-ranging from the highly mechanical rule of trespass at one end of the spectrum to the highly judgmental rule of public nuisance at the other, with private nuisance falling somewhere in between.'22 These standards would also correspond to a rough continuum in terms of transaction costs, with trespass applying to visible invasions generally having low transaction costs; private nuisance to invisible invasions involving small numbers of parties, but which because of possible difficulties of identification and enforcement probably would entail somewhat higher transaction costs; and public nuisance to widespread environmental harms, where negotiated solutions are truly improbable.
More generally, the transaction-cost/entitlement-determination-cost model provides an important justification for mechanical legal rules, which have been in vague disrepute for some time. Part of the legacy of the legal realist movement is that legal rules are viewed as "policy tools," and legal scholars demand that every rule have some "policy justification."'23 Mechanical rules tend to fare rather badly in such an environment, particularly when viewed solely as decisional rules for use in litigation, rather than as rules designed to avoid recourse to litigation. dimensional test for determining the boundary between trespass and nuisance-are crude and inflexible and often seem to produce unfair (or inefficient) results in particular cases.124 This leads commentators to question the desirability of such rules and to urge other rules-typically multifactorial balancing tests-in their place. Such "reform," however, may only make negotiated solutions to resource use disputes harder to reach, thus undermining the general efficiency of the economic system. Related to this is a point about the distributional consequences of mechanical and judgmental rules. Generally speaking, laymen tend to prefer mechanical rules, even if they seem silly or inefficient, whereas spokesmen for the legal community-including leading academics and judgestend to prefer judgmental rules.125 This is as one would predict, assuming that laymen prefer private solutions to resource disputes that minimize the demand for lawyers and litigation, whereas the legal community prefers collective solutions that increase the demand. Thus, if one believes that we have too many lawyers or too much litigation, not only should one ask that legislatures exercise restraint in replacing common-law rules with regulatory schemes; one should also demand that courts exercise restraint in replacing mechanical entitlement-determination rules with judgmental entitlement-determination rules.
On the other side of the ledger, judgmental rules have also recently come under criticism from legal scholars. For example, two of the areas touched upon in this paper-nuisance and takings law-are notorious for their doctrinal confusion and "ad hocery." Academics with a more theoretical bent-those whom Bruce Ackerman calls "scientific policymakers" '26-have been understandably frustrated by this state of affairs, and have sought to create new conceptual systems from first principles to 124 reform these areas of the law.127 Yet these efforts, however interesting and commendable, have to a certain extent missed the point: doctrinal confusion, question-begging Latin phrases, and unpredictable balancing tests may be functional. That is, what the system builder perceives as unprincipled decision making may in fact function as a relatively inexpensive judgmental entitlement-determination rule. Why relatively inexpensive? Because doctrinal indeterminacy affords a judge the discretion to manipulate legal rules to achieve the result he intuits to be most fair (or efficient), without having to articulate all the factors that go into the development of that conclusion. In contrast, an internally coherent system created from first principles-cost-benefit analysis immediately comes to mind-may permit an equally wide range of results but will likely require a time-consuming (and thus expensive) examination and articulation of the factors that go into the formulation of the result. I do not want to be understood to be saying that unprincipled decision making is a good thing.128 My point is simply that the persistence of unprincipled decision making should not come as a surprise. Principled decision making, like other social goods, is costly, and the more resources devoted to any one particular good, the less will be left for other ends that a rational society may desire to pursue. 
